Grøstl is one of the five finalist hash functions of the SHA-3 competition. For entering this final phase, the designers have tweaked the submitted versions. This tweak renders inapplicable the best known distinguishers on the compression function presented by Peyrin [18] that exploited the internal permutation properties. Since the beginning of the final round, very few analysis have been published on Grøstl. Currently, the best known rebound-based results on the permutation and the compression function for the 256-bit version work up to 8 rounds, and up to 7 rounds for the 512-bit version. In this paper, we present new rebound distinguishers that work on a higher number of rounds for the permutations of both 256 and 512-bit versions of this finalist, that is 9 and 10 respectively. Our distinguishers make use of an algorithm that we propose for solving three fully active states in the middle of the differential characteristic, while the Super-Sbox technique only handles two.
analysis communicated on Grøstl was at the presentation of [1] where a higher order property on 10 rounds of Grøstl-256 permutation with a complexity of 2 509 was shown. In Table 1 , we report a summary of the best known results on both 256 and 512-bit tweaked versions of Grøstl, including the ones that we will present in the following.
In this paper, we propose new results regarding both versions of the finalist Grøstl. First, on Grøstl-256, we provide the best known rebound distinguishers on 9 rounds of the permutation. From these results, we show how to make some nontrivial observations on the the compression function, providing the best known analysis on the compression function exploiting the properties of the internal permutations. For Grøstl-512, we considerably increase the number of analyzed rounds, from 7 to 10, providing the best analysis known on the permutation. Both results are obtained using rebound-like attack techniques and an algorithm that we introduce that allows to solve three fully active rounds in the middle of the differential characteristic with a much lower cost than a generic algorithm. Additionnally, we provide in Appendix A the direct application of our new techniques to the AES-based hash function PHOTON.
These results do not threaten the security of Grøstl, but we believe they will have an important role in better understanding Grøstl, and AES-based functions in general. In particular, we believe that our work will help determining the bounds and limits of rebound-like attacks in these types of constructions. Table 1 : Best known analysis on the finalist Grøstl. By best analysis, we mean the ones on the highest number of rounds.
Generalities

Description of Grøstl
The hash function Grøstl-0 has been submitted to the SHA-3 competition under two different versions: Grøstl-0-256, which outputs a 256-bit digest and Grøstl-0-512 with a 512-bit fingerprint. For the final round of the competition, the candidate have been tweaked to Grøstl, with corresponding versions Grøstl-256 and Grøstl-512.
The Grøstl hash function handles arbitrary long messages by diving them into blocks after some padding and uses them to update iteratively an internal state (initialized to a predefined IV) with a compression function. This function is itself built upon two different permutations, namely P and Q. Each of those two permutations updates a large internal state using the wellunderstood wide-trail strategy of the AES. As an AES-like Substitution-Permutation Network, Grøstl enjoys a strong diffusion in each of the two permutations and by its wide-pipe design, the size of the internal states is ensured to be at least twice as large as the final digest.
The compression function f 256 of Grøstl-256 uses two permutations P 256 and Q 256 , which are similar to the two permutations P 512 and Q 512 used in the compression function f 512 of Grøstl-512. More precisely, for a chaining value h and a message block m, the compression functions ( Figure 1 ) produce the output (⊕ denotes the XOR operation): The internal states are viewed as byte matrices of size 8 × 8 for the 256-bit version and 8 × 16 for the 512-bit one. The permutations strictly follow the design of the AES and are constructed as N r iterations of the composition of four basic transformations:
All the linear operations are performed in the same finite field GF (2 8 ) as in the AES, defined via the irreducible polynomial x 8 + x 4 + x 3 + x + 1 over GF (2) . The AddRoundConstant (AC) operation adds a predefined round-dependent constant, which significantly differs between P and Q to prevent the internal differential attack [18] taking advantage of the similarities in P and Q. The SubBytes (SB) layer is the non-linear layer of the round function R and applies the same SBox as in the AES to all the bytes of the internal state. The ShiftBytes (Sh) transformation shifts bytes in row i by τ P [i] positions to the left for permutation P and τ Q [i] positions for permutation Q. We note that τ also differs from P to Q to emphasize the asymmetry between the two permutations. Finally, the MixBytes (Mb) operation applies a maximumdistance separable (MDS) circulant constant matrix M independently to all the columns of the state. In Grøstl-256, N r = 10, τ P = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] and τ Q = [1, 3, 5, 7, 0, 2, 4, 6], whereas for Grøstl-512, N r = 14 and τ P = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11] and τ Q = [1, 3, 5, 11, 0, 2, 4, 6] .
Once all the message blocks of the padded input message have been processed by the compression function, a final output transformation is applied to the last chaining value h to produce the final n-bit hash value h = trunc n (P (h) ⊕ h), where trunc n only keeps the last n bits.
Distinguishers
In this article, we will describe algorithms that find input pairs (X, X ) for the permutation P (or the permutation Q), such that the input difference ∆ IN = X ⊕ X belongs to a subset of size IN and the output difference ∆ OU T = P (X) ⊕ P (X ) belongs to a subset of size OU T . The best known generic algorithm (this problem is different than the one studied in [8] where linear subspaces are considered) in order to solve this problem, known as limited-birthday problem, has been given in [3] and later a very close lower bound has been proven in [16] . For a randomly chosen n-bit permutation π, the generic algorithm can find such a pair with complexity max{min{ 2 n /IN , 2 n /OU T }, 2 n /(IN · OU T )}. If one is able to describe an algorithm requiring less computation power, then we consider that a distinguisher exists on the permutation π.
In the case of Grøstl, it is also interesting to look at not only the internal permutations P and Q, but also the compression function f itself. For that matter, we will generate compression function input values (h, m) such that ∆ IN = m ⊕ h belongs to a subset of size IN , and such that
belongs to a subset of size OU T . Then, one can remark that:
Since the permutation Q is supposed to have no structural flaw, the best known generic algorithm requires max{min{ 2 n /IN , 2 n /OU T }, 2 n /(IN · OU T )} operations (the situation is exactly the same as the permutation distinguisher with permutation Q) to find a pair (h, m) of inputs such that h ⊕ m ∈ IN and f (h, m) ⊕ f (m, h) ⊕ h ⊕ m ∈ OU T . Note that both IN and OU T are specific to our attacks.
We emphasize that even if trivial distinguishers are already known for the Grøstl compression function (for example fixed-points), no distinguisher is known for the internal permutations. Moreover, our observations on the compression function use the differential properties of the internal permutations.
Distinguishers for reduced Grøstl-256 internal permutations
In this section, we describe a distinguisher for the permutation P 256 of the Grøstl-256 compression function reduced to 9 rounds. We emphasize that in the latest version of the Grøstl submission [20] , the permutation Q 256 has different coefficients in the ShiftRows transformation, but the technique we describe in the following applies to Q 256 as well.
The truncated differential characteristic
In the following, we will consider truncated differential characteristics, originally introduced by Knudsen [7] for block cipher analysis. With this technique, already proven to be efficient for AESbased hash functions cryptanalysis [5, 6, 10, 17] , the attacker only checks if there is a difference in a byte (active byte, denoted by a black square in the Figures) or not (inactive byte, denoted by an empty square in the Figures) without caring about the actual value of the difference.
The truncated differential characteristic we use has the sequence of active bytes
where the size in the input and output differences subsets are both IN = OU T = 2 8×8 = 2 64 , since there are eight active bytes in each extreme state of the truncated characteristic. The actual truncated characteristic is reported in Appendix B.
Note that we have three fully active internal states in the middle of the differential characteristic, thus impossible to handle with the classical rebound or SuperSBox techniques.
Finding a conforming pair
The method to find a pair of inputs conforming to this truncated differential characteristic is similar to the rebound technique: we first find many solutions for the middle rounds (round 3 to round 6) and then we filter them out during the outwards probabilistic transitions through the MixBytes layers (round 2 and round 7). We denote x → y a non-null truncated differential transition mapping x active bytes to y active bytes in a column through a MixBytes (or MixBytes −1 ) layer, and the MDS property ensures x + y ≥ 9. Its differential probability is determined by the number (8 − y) of inactive bytes on the output: 2 −8 (8−y) if the MDS property is verified, 0 otherwise. Therefore, since in our case we have two transitions 8 → 1 (see Figure 2 ), the outbound phase has a success probability of 2 −8×7 2 = 2 −112 and is straightforward to handle once we found enough solutions for the inbound phase.
In order to find solutions for the middle rounds (see Figure 2 ), we propose an algorithm inspired by the ones in [14, 15] : As in [3, 8] , instead of dealing with the classical 8-bit SubBytes SBoxes, one can consider 64-bit SBoxes (named SuperSBoxes) each composed of two AES SBox layers surrounding one MixBytes and one AddRoundConstant function 1 . Indeed, the ShiftBytes can be taken out from the SuperSBoxes since it commutes with SubBytes.
We start by choosing the input difference δ IN after the first SubBytes layer in state S1 and the output difference δ OU T after the last MixBytes layer in state S12 in a way that the truncated characteristic holds in S0 and S12. Note that since we have 8 active bytes in S1 and S12, there are as many as 2 2×64 = 2 128 different ways of choosing (δ IN , δ OU T ). We continue by constructing the 8 forward SuperSBox independently by considering the 2 64 possible input values for each of them in state S3: differences in S1 can be directly propagated to S3 since MixBytes is linear. This generates 8 independent lists, each of size 2 64 and composed by paired values. Doing the same for the 8 backwards SuperSBoxes from state S12, we again get 8 independent lists of 2 64 elements each, and we end up in state S8 where the 8 forward and the 8 backward lists overlap. In the sequel, we denote L i the ith forward SuperSBox list and L i the ith backward one, for 1 ≤ i ≤ 8.
In terms of freedom degrees in state S8, we want to merge 16 lists of 2 64 elements each for a merging condition on 2 × 512 = 1024 bits (512 for values and 512 for differences): we then expect 2 16×64 2 −1024 = 1 solution as a result of the merging process. We detail a method in order to find this solution in time 2 256 and memory 2 64 (see Figure 3 ).
Step 1. We start by considering every possible combination of elements in each of the four lists L 1 , L 2 , L 3 and L 4 . There are 2 256 possibilities.
Step 2. This fully constraints 2 × 4 bytes in each of the 8 lists L i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 8 (i.e. the first 4 columns of the internal state). For each of them, we then expect 2 64 2 −8×8 = 1 element to match the randomized bytes. These elements can be found with one operation by sorting the lists L i beforehand. At this point, note that the second half of the state S8 has been fully determined by the choice in L 1 , . . . , L 8 .
Step 3. We now need to ensure that the 4 last lists L 5 , L 6 , L 7 and L 8 contain the elements imposed: those lists being of size 2 64 each, this happens with probability 2 64 2 −8×(2×8) = 2 −64 independently on each list. Again, these elements can be found with one operation by sorting the lists L i beforehand. S9 S10 S11 S12 All in all, trying all the 2 256 elements in (L 1 , L 2 , L 3 , L 4 ), we expect to find 2 256 2 −64×4 = 1 solution that will verify the 1024 bits of condition and we can find this solution with only a few operations.
Hence, from random differences (δ IN , δ OU T ), we find a pair of internal states of the permutation that conforms to the middle rounds in time 2 256 and memory 2 64 . To pass the probabilistic transitions of the outbound phase, we need to repeat the merging 2 112 times by picking another couple of differences (δ IN , δ OU T ). In total, we find a pair of inputs to the permutation that conforms to the truncated differential characteristic in time complexity 2 368 and memory complexity 2 64 .
Comparison with ideal case
In the ideal case, obtaining a pair whose input and output differences lie in a subset of size IN = OU T = 2 64 for a 512-bit permutation requires 2 384 computations: we can directly conclude that this leads to a distinguishing attack on the 9-round reduced version of the Grøstl-256 permutation with 2 368 computations and 2 64 memory. Similarly, as explained in Section 2.2, this result also induces a nontrivial observation on the 9-round reduced version of the Grøstl-256 compression function with identical complexity.
Finally, one can also derive slightly cheaper distinguishers by aiming less rounds: instead of using the 9-round truncated characteristic from Appendix B, it is possible to remove either round 2 or 8 and spare one 8 → 1 truncated differential transition. Overall, the generic complexity remains the same and this gives a distinguishing attack on the 8-round reduced version of the Grøstl-256 permutation with 2 312 computations and 2 64 memory. Unfortunately, this is worse than previously known results.
Distinguishers for reduced Grøstl-512 internal permutations
The 512-bit version of the Grøstl hash function uses a non-square 8 × 16 matrix as 1024-bit internal state, which therefore presents a lack of optimal diffusion: a single difference generates a fully active state after three rounds where a square-state would need only two. This enables us to add an extra round to the generalization of the regular 9-round characteristic of AES-like permutation (Section 3) to reach 10 rounds.
The truncated differential characteristic
To distinguish its permutation P 512 2 reduced to 10 rounds, we use the truncated differential characteristic with the sequence of active bytes
where the size of the input differences subset is IN = 2 512 and the size of the output differences subset is OU T = 2 64 .
The actual truncated characteristic is appended in Appendix C. Again, we split the characteristic into two parts: the inbound phase involving a merging of lists in the four middle rounds (round 4 to round 7), and an outbound phase that behaves as a probabilistic filter ensuring both 8 −→ 1 transitions in the outward directions. Again, passing those two transitions with random values occurs with probability 2 −112 .
Finding a conforming pair
In the following, we present an algorithm to solve the middle rounds in time 2 280 and memory 2 64 . In total, we will need to repeat this process 2 112 times to get a pair of internal states that conforms to the whole truncated differential characteristic, which would then cost 2 280+112 = 2 392 in time and 2 64 in memory. The strategy of this algorithm (see Figure 4 ) is similar to the ones presented in [14, 15] and the one from the previous section: we start by fixing the difference to a random value δ IN in S1 and δ OU T in S12 and linearly deduce the difference δ IN in S3 and δ OU T in S10. Then, we construct the 32 lists corresponding to the 32 SuperSBoxes: the 16 forward SuperSBoxes have an input difference fixed to δ IN and cover states S3 to S8, whereas the 16 backward SuperSBoxes spread over states S10 to S6 with an output difference fixed
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S9 S10 S11 S12 to δ OU T . In the sequel, we denote L i the 16 forward SuperSBoxes and L i the backward ones,
The 32 lists overlap in S8, where we merge them on 2048 bits 3 to find 2 64×32 2 −2048 = 1 solution, since each list is of size 2 64 . The naive way to find the solution would cost 2 1024 in time by considering each element of the Cartesian product of the 16 lists L i to check whether it satisfies the output 1024 bit difference condition. We describe now the algorithm that achieves the same goal in time 2 280 .
First, we observe that due to the geometry of the non-square state, any list L i intersects with only half of the L i . For instance, the first list L 1 associated to the first column of state S7 intersects with lists L 1 , L 6 , L 11 , L 12 , L 13 , L 14 , L 15 and L 16 . We represent this property with a 16 × 16 array on Figure 5 : the 16 columns correspond to the 16 lists L i and the lines to the L i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 16. The cell (i, j) is white if and only if L i has a non-null intersection with the list L j , otherwise it is gray.
Then, we note that the MixBytes transition between the states S8 and S9 constraints the differences in the lists L i : in the first column of S9 for example, only three bytes are active, so that the same column in S8 can only have 2 3×8 different differences, which means that knowing three out of the eight differences in an element of L 1 is enough to deduce the other five. For a column-vector of differences lying in a n-dimensional subspace, we can divide the 2 64 elements of the associated lists in 2 8n disjointed sets of 2 64−8n values each. So, whenever we know the n independent differences, the only freedom that remains lie in the values. The bottom line of Figure 5 reports the subspace dimensions for each L i .
Using a guess-and-determine approach, we derive a way to use the previous facts to find the solution to the merge problem in time 2 280 . As stated before, we expect only one solution; that is, we want to find a single element in each of the 32 lists. We start by guessing the values and the Figure 5 : A means we know both value and difference for that byte, a means that we only determined the difference for that byte and white bytes are not constrained yet.
differences of the elements associated to the lists L 2 , L 3 , L 4 and L 5 . For this, we will try all the possible combinations of their elements, there are 2 4×64 = 2 256 in total. For each one of the 2 256 tries, all the checked cells now have known value and difference. From here, 8 bytes are known in each of the four lists L 5 , L 6 , L 7 and L 8 : this imposes a 64-bit constraint on those lists, which filter out a single element in each. Thereby, we determined the value and difference in the other 16 bytes marked by in Figure 5 . In lists L 1 and L 16 , we have reached the maximum number of independent differences (three and two, respectively), so we can determine the differences for the other bytes of those columns: we mark them by . In L 4 , the 8 constraints (three and two ) filter out one element; then, we deduce the correct element in L 4 and mark it by . We can now determine the differences in L 15 since the corresponding subspace has a dimension equals to two.
At this point, no more byte can be determined based on the information propagated so far. We continue by guessing the elements remaining in L 6 . Since there are already six byte-constraints on that list (three ), only 2 16 elements conform to the conditions. The time complexity until now is thus 2 256+16 = 2 272 .
Guessing the list L 6 implies a 64-bit constraint of the list L 9 so that we get a single element out of it and determine four yet-unknown other bytes. This enables to learn the independent differences in L 14 and therefore, we filter an element from L 3 (two and four ). At this stage, the list L 1 is already fully constrained on its differences, so that we are left with a set of A means we know both value and difference for that byte, a means that we only determined the difference for that byte and white bytes are not constrained yet.
2 64−3×8 = 2 40 values constrained on five bytes (five ). Hence, we are able to determine all the unset values in L 1 (Figure 6a ).
Again, the lack of constraints prevent us to determine more bytes. We continue by guessing the 2 8 elements left in L 1 (two and three ), which makes the time complexity increase to 2 280 . The list L 1 being totally known, we derive the vector of differences in L 13 , which adds an extra byte-constraint on L 2 where only one element was left, and so fully determines it. From here, L 7 becomes fully determined as well (four ) and so is L 16 . In the latter, the differences being known, we were left with a set of 2 64−2×8 = 2 48 values, which are now constrained on six bytes (six ).
We describe in Figure 6b the knowledge propagated so far, with time complexity 2 280 and probability 1. We observe that L 10 is overdetermined (four and one ) by one byte. This means that we get the correct value with probability 2 −8 , whereas L 11 is filtered with probability 1. Similarly, the element of L 8 happens to be correctly defined with probability 2 −16 ; as for L 9 and L 15 , with probability 1. We continue in L 11 by learning the full vector of differences, which constraints L 12 on 11 bytes (five and one ) so that we get a valid element with probability 2 −24 . Finishing the guess and determine technique is done by filtering L 10 and L 12 with probability 1, L 16 with probability 2 −40 and L 13 , L 14 and L 15 with probability 2 −64 each.
In total, for each guess, we successfully merge the 32 lists with probability 2 −8−16−24−40−64−64−64 = 2 −280 , but the whole procedure is repeated 2 64×4+16+8 = 2 280 times, so we expect to find the one existing solution. All in all, we described a way to do the merge with time complexity 2 280 and memory complexity 2 64 . The final complexity to find a valid candidate for the whole characteristic is then 2 392 computations and 2 64 memory.
Comparison with ideal case
In the ideal case, obtaining a pair whose input difference lies in a subset of size IN = 2 512 and whose output difference lies in a subset of size OU T = 2 64 for a 1024-bit permutation requires 2 448 computations. We can directly conclude that this leads to a distinguishing attack on the 10round reduced version of the Grøstl-512 permutation with 2 392 computations and 2 64 memory. Similarly, as explained in Section 2.2, this results also induces a nontrivial observation on the 10-round reduced version of the Grøstl-512 compression function with identical complexity.
One can also derive slightly cheaper distinguishers by aiming less rounds while keeping the same generic complexity: instead of using the 10-round truncated characteristic from Appendix C, it is possible to remove either round 3 or 9 and spare one 8 → 1 truncated differential transition. Overall, this gives a distinguishing attack on the 9-round reduced version of the Grøstl-512 permutation with 2 336 computations and 2 64 memory. By removing both rounds 3 and 9, we achieve 8 rounds with 2 280 computations.
One can further gain another small factor for the 9-round case by using a 8 → 2 truncated differential transition instead of 8 → 1, for a final complexity of 2 328 computations and 2 64 memory. Indeed, the generic complexity drops to 2 384 because we would now have OU T = 2 128 .
Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided new and improved cryptanalysis results on the building blocks of both 256 and 512-bit versions of the finalist Grøstl. This is done by using a rebound-like approach as well as an algorithm that allows us to pass three fully active states in the middle of the differential characteristic with lower complexity than a general probabilistic approach. To the best of our knowledge, all previously known methods only manage to control two fully active states in the middle of the differential characteristic.
On Grøstl-256, we could provide the best known rebound distinguishers on 9 rounds of the permutation. For Grøstl-512, we have considerably increased the number of analyzed rounds, from 7 to 10, providing the best analysis known the permutation.
These results do not threaten the security of Grøstl, but we believe they will have an important role in better understanding AES-based functions in general. In particular, we believe that our work will help determining the bounds and limits of rebound-like attacks in these types of constructions. Future works could include the study of more AES-like functions in regards to this new cryptanalysis method.
A Distinguishers for other AES-like permutations
Using the same cryptanalysis technique, it is possible to study other AES-like schemes using permutations similar to the Grøstl ones. For example, the recent lightweigth hash function family PHOTON [4] is based on five different versions of AES-like permutations. We denote s the size of the cells (s = 8 for AES) and c the size of the square matrix representing the internal state (c = 4 for AES), the five versions (s, c) for PHOTON are then (4, 5), (4, 6), (4, 7), (4, 8) and (8, 6) for increasing versions. All versions are defined to apply 12 rounds of an AES-like process, where the subkey additions are replaced by constant additions. Since the internal state is always square, by trivially adapting the method from Section 3 to the specific parameters of PHOTON, one can hope to obtain distinguishers for 9 rounds of the PHOTON internal permutations. However, we are able to do so only for the parameters (4, 8) used in PHOTON-224/32/32 (see Table 2 with the comparison to previously known results). Indeed, the size c of the matrix plays an important role in the gap between the complexity of our algorithm and the generic one. The bigger is the matrix, the better will be the gap between the algorithm complexity and the generic one.
The same effect applies on AES in the known-key model, for which distinguishers on only 8 rounds are known as of today [3] . When attacking 9 rounds with the method from Section 3, the middle rounds will cost about 2 64 operations per solution, while the two 4 → 1 truncated differential transitions during the outbound will be verified with probability (2 −24 ) 2 = 2 −48 . Overall, one solution for the whole characteristic is found with 2 112 computation and 2 32 memory, but the generic algorithm can find such a pair with only 2 64 . Figure 7 : The 9-round truncated differential characteristic used to distinguish the permutation P of Grøstl-256 from an ideal permutation. Figure 8 : The 10-round truncated differential characteristic used to distinguish the permutation P of Grøstl-512 from an ideal permutation.
